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Abstract 
In this article we propose a new enrollment scheme for biometric template based on hash chaos-based cryptography (more 
precisely Davies – Meyer scheme). The idea of the scheme is to create a strong and unique authentication process of the 
biometric templates and to guarantee the safety of the biometric data. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of DAAAM International Vienna. 
Keywords: biometrics; enrollment;chaos cryptography; davies-meyer; hash function 
1. Introduction 
The biometric process, despite its many advantages, it’s also vulnerable to attacks that can diminish its security. 
These possible attacks were analysed by Ratha et al. [1], who separated them into eight classes. In addition, different 
suggests about the possible attacks on biometric process were made by Dimitriadis [5]. In this paper we approach 
only the template database attacks, in other words attacks on template database (e.g. modifying an existing template, 
removing template, adding new template etc.). The biometric template is being stored in sensing device, smart card 
and central repository. In the center of the system where are stored the biometric templates the imposer can insert a 
fake template or templates, in order to gain unauthorized access. As a consequence, the legitimate user faces denial 
of service. A method to prevent this from happening is to use smart cards, in which case the template would be 
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stored, written and erased or destroyed in case of altered technique. Another option is applying strong security 
controls or protection schemes to protect the template in case of the absence of the first option. [4] 
Different scheme are used to the purpose of protecting the database from the imposter. The literature proposes two 
such classifiable categories of schemes: 
- The feature transformation approach 
- The biometric cryptosystem. 
In this further approach a transformation function ሺܨሻ is applied to the biometric template ሺܶሻ while the database 
stores only the transformed templateሺܨሺܶǢܭሻሻ. Usually, the parameters of the transformation function derive from 
a random key ሺܭሻ or the password. Another way to classify these schemes is by categorizing them in invertible and 
non-invertible transforms. In the case of invertible transforms, an adversary has access to the key and to the 
transformed template, this way being able to recover the original biometric template (or a close approximation of it), 
having in mind that security of the invertible scheme is based on the secrecy of the key or password [27]. Yet, the 
non-invertible transformation schemes are more effective, considering that they apply a one-way function on the 
template, making so more difficult computationally to invert a transformed template, although the key may be 
known. In case the helper data is obtained by binding an independent (from the biometric features) key with the 
biometric template, this wares the name of biometric cryptosystem [29]. The biometric cryptosystem’s initial 
function was to secure, using biometric features, a cryptographic key or to generate directly, from biometric 
features, a cryptographic key, functions which can also be called helper data-based methods. Depending on the 
process of obtaining the data, the biometric cryptosystems could also be classified in key binding and key generation 
systems. Bear in mind that it is difficult to computationally recover the key or the original template, when only the 
helper data is given [25,26,6]. 
In order to match in a key binding system it is imperative to recover the key from the helper data, and we do so 
by using the query biometric features. In the situation in which the cryptographic key is generated directly from the 
helper data and from the query biometric features and the helper data derivate only from the biometric template, this 
leads to a key generation biometric cryptosystem. It is also known that there are certain template protection 
techniques that use more than one basic approach. [11] 
One of the invertible transformation biometric protection schemes approached, in which the transformation is 
realized through user specific key or password, is the bio-hashing or salting. This implies that the user must securely 
store the key or remember the password in the course of authentication [8]. At this point we can introduce and 
describe the notion of cancellable biometrics, which refers to the distortion that is systematically and intentionally 
repeated, with the purpose of protecting biometric template [14]. This type of biometrics is a non-invertible 
approach, which means that if a cancellable feature is compromised, the features of the distortion change while 
mapping the same biometrics to a new template, subsequently used [9]. The undistorted (original) biometrics can’t 
be recovered, even in the case of knowing the transformation function and the resulting transformed biometric data. 
This requires an approach of steganography and watermarking. First of them involves the process of hiding 
information and its based techniques can be used to transfer critical biometric information from template storage to 
the matcher [12]. 
On the other hand, we can use a watermarking technique to protect database and to transfer on channel, because 
this is a technique that allows one pattern to be embedded into another pattern. But there is also a third technique 
that can be to prevent channel attack is challenge-response system.  
This is the image based challenge-response method [2]. Here, the sensor is being presented with the challenge, 
which makes the response string to depend on the challenge string and the content of the acquired input image. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
The Merkle – Damgard represents the foundation of many hash functions, such as SHA, MD5 [2]. As a 
general start, a hash function creates a message digest of fixed length from an arbitrary message length. 
We have to retain the fact that the hash value sometimes refers to a hash-code or message digest [23-27]. 
Hash functions can be classified into two categories: hash functions un-keyed which are based on a single 
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input parameter, which is the message and hash functions keyed, based on two inputs (the message and a 
secret key). 
The hash function presented in this article takes into consideration the following general properties [1]: 
a. Preimage resistance: essentially, all outputs which pre-specified are computationally 
impossible to find and to match any input which can hash that output. This is very important 
as pre-image to find any ݔԢ in such manner that ݄ሺݔԢ ሻ ൌ ݕ when we have any ݕ for which we 
have a known input. 
b. 2nd pre-image resistance: it is impossible computationally to find and to match a second input 
which is able to have the same output as any specified input, by having a ݔ given and to find 
a 2nd – pre-image ݔԢ ് ݔ in such way that ݄ሺݔԢ ሻ ൌ ݄ሺݔሻ. 
c. Compression: the input can be arbitrary finite from the point of view of bit length, and the 
output is fixed bit length, such as 512-bit, 256-bit, 128-bit. 
d. Collision resistance: computationally is impossible to find two distinct inputs ݔǡ ݔԢ that are 
able to have the same output in a such way that ݄ሺݔԢ ሻ ൌ ݄ሺݔሻ. 
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Fig.1. The Merkle-Damgard scheme for iterated hash function. 
 
The Davies-May function represents a one-way compression function for a single-block-length which 
passes each block of the message ሺ݉݅ሻ as a key to that block cipher. It passes the previous hash-value ሺܪ݅െͳሻ as the 
plaintext that will be encrypted. The output resulted as a cipher text will be XORed ሺْሻwith the previous hash 
valueሺܪ݅െͳሻ, which will produce the next hash valueሺܪ݅ሻ. For the first round, when we don’t have a previous hash 
value, we use a pre-specified valueሺܪͲሻ. 
As a mathematical expression, Davies-May can be represented as: 
 
ܪ݅ ൌ ܧ݉݅ሺܪ݅െͳሻْܪ݅െͳ      ( 1 ) 
       
Emi
Hi-1
ْ
Hi   
Fig. 2. The Davies-May compression function. 
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Yi combined in [11] the chaotic iteration with the scheme of Davies-May, using 75-times the 
iterations of a chaotic tent map under the form of a cipher, in order to generate the hash value. Messages 
are divided in blocks by this algorithm for further processing. When both the chaotic phase space and 
parameter space are influenced, the result is that message units are modulated into the chaotic iteration.  
This algorithm presents a chaotic tent map ܨߙሺݔ݅ሻ with parameterߙ: 
 
 
 
ܨߙሺݔ݅ሻ ൌ ൝
ݔ݅െͳ
ߙ ǡ Ͳ ൑ ݔ݅െͳ ൑ ߙ
ͳെݔ݅െͳ
ͳെߙ ǡߙ ൑ ݔ݅െͳ ൑ ͳ
      
  ( 2 ) 
whereͲ ൏ ߙ ൏ ͳ. 
 
Usingܨߙሺݔ݅ሻ, we can define a map ܩߙ  as follows: 
ܩߙ ǣݔ݅ ൌ ൜ܨܣሺߙሻሺݔ݅െͳሻǡͲ ൏ ݔ݅െͳ ൏ ͳߚǡ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݏ       ( 3 ) 
 ܣሺߙሻ is an affine mapping from [0,1) to a sufficiently small interval around 0.5, and Ͳ ൏ ߚ ൏ ͳ is a constant. In this 
context, ܩ݊ߙ  representsܩߙ ל ܩߙ ל ܩߙ ל ǥ ל ܩߙᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
݊
. 
 
2.1. The Description of the Algorithm 
The algorithms consist in several steps which are described below. From my personal point of view, the 
algorithm is not the most optimal one, but he do the job in our case very well. 
 
- Primarily, a message M with arbitrary length is padded until the size of the message becomes 
multiple of l. Then we broke the padded message into blocksܯͲǡܯͳǡǥ ǡܯݎെͳ, each having l bits 
(where the last l-bit block ܯݎ  represents the length of M in bits). 
We change the l-bit block ܯ݅ = ሺ݌݅ͳ݌݅ʹ ǥ݌݈݅ሻ  (where ݅ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡǥ ǡ ݎ ) into a pair of binary 
fractionsሺ݉݅ ǡ݉෦݅ሻ, where ݉݅ ൌ ͲǤ݌݅ͳ݌݅ʹ ǥ݌݈݅  and݉෦݅ ൌ ͲǤ݌݈݅݌݅ሺ݈െͳሻ ǥ݌݈݅ . 
- Let ݅ ൌ Ͳ and input a pair of common initial binary fractionsሺݏͲǡ ݐͲሻ, where ݏͲ ൌ ͲǤ ݏͲͳݏͲʹ ǥݏͲ݈ , 
ݐͲ ൌ ͲǤ ݐͲͳݐͲʹ ǥݐͲ݈ , in which case they necessarily must to be kept secret. 
- Another step is the hashing of the quadruple binary fractions (ݏ݅ ǡ ݐ݅ ǡ݉݅ ǡ݉෦݅) with a hash round 
function ܪinto a pair of binary fractionsሺݏ݅൅ͳǡ ݐ݅൅ͳሻ. The symbols ٛ and ٔ are defined in the 
following way, to describe the hash round function: 
ݔ ٛ ݕ ൌ ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻሺ݉݋݀ͳሻ        ( 4 ) 
ݏ ٔ ݕ ൌ ܩ ሺݔ ǡݕሻሺሺݔǡݕሻሻ      ( 5 ) 
 
ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻ is used as a block cipher in the hash round function ܪ, and in ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻ, ݔͲ ൌ ݏ݅ ٛ ݉݅ ǡߙ ൌ ݐ݅ ٛ ݉෦݅ . In 
this context, let 
 
ݖ݅ ൌ ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻ ൌ ܩݐ݅ٛ݉෦݅݊ ሺݏ݅ ٛ݉݅ሻ     ( 6 ) 
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The hash round function can be divided into two hash round functionsܪͳǡܪʹ, equation (7) and (8): 
 
ܪͳǣ ݐ݅൅ͳ ൌ ݏ݅ ٛ ݖ݅      ( 7 ) 
ܪʹǣ ݏ݅൅ͳ ൌ ݐ݅ ٔ ሺ݉෦݅ ٛ ݖ݅ሻ ( 8 ) 
 
- Let ݅ ൌ ݅ ൅ ͳǤ If ݅ ൑ ݎ then return to previous step. 
- The Performance analysis of the pair of binary fractions ሺݏݎ൅ͳ ൌ ͲǤܽͳܽʹǥ Ǥ݈ܽ ǥ ǡ ݐݎ൅ͳ ൌ
ͲǤ ܾͳܾʹǥܾ݈ ǥ Ǥ ሻ which are the output of the last iteration concludes that the output ʹ݈-bit hash 
value ݄ ൌ ሺܽͳܽʹǥ݈ܾܽͳܾʹǥܾ݈ሻ. 
- An important role in the hash round function plays Statistical analysis of ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻ . Its two 
parameters ߙǡ݊ determine its characteristics, given that it evolved from the chaotic tent. 
First test – Uniform distribution  
 
In [11], the author proves the following:  
1. For any givenͲ ൑ ߙ ൏ ͳ, the distribution of ݔͳ ൌ ܩߙሺݔͲሻ for randomly chosen Ͳ ൏ ݔͲ ൏ ͳ is 
the standard uniform distribution;  
2. For any Ͳ ൑ ߙ ൏ ͳ and݊, the distribution of ݔ݊ ൌ ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻfor randomly chosen Ͳ ൏ ݔͲ ൏ ͳ 
is the standard uniform distribution ܷሺͲǡͳሻǤ 
 
Second test – The determination of the minimum number of iterations 
 
In this context, [11] has proved that, if the number of iterations݊ ൒ ͹͵, the distribution of ܩߙ൅οߙ݊ ሺݔͲሻ 
for even tiny οߙ is independent from the distribution of ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻ. In this case, we chose the minimum 
number of iterations in this hash algorithm to be ݊ ൌ ͹ͷ. 
In this section we will make a quick review of the most important work papers regarding the chaotic hash 
functions. We will focus on the construction of chaos-based hash algorithms. Trying to integrate chaos into hash 
functions represents a promising direction which attracts more and more attention. It’s very interesting to see how, 
by borrowing some of the classical cryptography, we can see a summary of the instructions regarding the securing 
construction of chaos-based hash function which is beneficial for the design of hash function on chaos for the next 
future. The model behind the chaotic environment consists in setting the initial value and the parameter as the 
algorithm secret key and start iteration. Many of the chaotic models, until now, have been introduced into hash 
function construction, such as simple chaotic map, complex chaotic map, composite map and chaotic neural 
networks.  
3. The proposed enrollment scheme 
The protection scheme proposed in this article is starting from the idea of creating a strong and powerful scheme 
for enrolment in biometric systems. Each message that is exchanged in this scheme is hashed with the algorithm 
described above, in section 2. 
One of the key aspects of this scheme is the generator of the session key. The generator is based on a chaotic 
phenomenon, composed from Rossler map and a pseudo random bit generator [11]. Rossler map is based on 
continuous time domain and have real space domain. The combination between the Rossler and [2] in the generator 
increase the power and the resistance on different cryptanalysis attacks, making a strong key and hard to recover. 
Other chaotic function properties and number generators are presented in [3,4]. 
The generator is based on the following general steps: 
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1. Generate three numbers a, b, and c. These numbers are used to calculate the Rossler differential 
equation. 
2. These numbers are converted into binary form, using the Binary Conversion function from the 
session key algorithm.  
3. The binary values are XORed ሺݔ۩ݕ۩ݖሻ and the final value is passed to the Session Key Stream 
Mapping function.  
4. A pseudo number is computed and XORed with the result from the session key stream mapping. 
This way, the key becomes more resistant to different attacks. 
5. The session key is passed to the enrolment scheme which is used together with the messages that 
are exchanged between the components of the scheme. The session key generated by this 
algorithm is used in the hash function presented above. As a mathematical representation of how 
the algorithm in question is introduced in the enrolment scheme, let’s consider that the message 
component represents actually the message M from the algorithm and SK is the session key 
generated above. 
ܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣ݈݃ሺܵܭǡ݉݁ݏݏܽ݃݁ܿ݋݉݌݋݊݁݊ݐሻ     ( 9 ) 
 
The key {x, y, z} is composed of three sub-key’s, in which each sub key is of the form sub-key = {initial value, r 
value}. The r value represents a positive number, which helps to identifying if there is a possibility to make a 
reproduction of the session key. First value, x value, is used for generating the 1st key stream, the second value, y 
value, is used for generating the 2nd key stream and the third key, z key, is used for generating the 3rd key stream. 2nd 
key stream `and 3rd key stream are illustrated in the next equation: 
 
ݏ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊݇݁ݕݏݐݎ݁ܽ݉ ൌ ܾͳǡܾʹǡǥ ǡ ܾ݊  where ܾ݊ א ہͲǡͳۂ         ( 10 ) 
 
We have three general types of behaviour for r value: 
1. If r is situated between 0 and 1, the session key is easy to reproduce in proportion of 30%; 
2. If r is situated between 1 and 2, the session key is difficult to reproduce  in proportion of 
50%; 
3. If r is situated between 2 and 3, the session key is difficult to reproduce  in proportion of 
70%; 
The session key stream mapping module for generating the 1st key stream is shown in the next equation:  
 
ݏ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊݇݁ݕݏݐݎ݁ܽ݉ ൌ ܾͳǡܾʹǡǥ ǡ ܾ݇ ǡܾ݇൅ͳǡǥ ǡܾʹ݇ ǡܾ݊  where ܾ݊ א ہͲǡͳۂ         ( 11 ) 
 
We can observe in figure 3 of the chaotic session key representation, that the session key is passed also the 
logistic map [1, 7, 10], which is given by, 
ݔ݊൅ͳ ൌ ݎ ȉ ݔ݊ሾͳെ ݔ݊ሿǡ Ͳ ൏ ݔ ൏ ͳ      ( 12 ) 
where ݔͲ (݊ ൌ Ͳሻ represents the initial value, r represents the bifurcation parameter and is dependent on the value r, 
ݔͲ represents the dynamics of the generated chaotic sequence which can change dramatically for  ͵Ǥͷ͹ ൏ ݎ ൑ Ͷ, this 
sequence being founded as non-periodic and non-converging [10]. The function for probability density of logistic 
map is symmetric and proven in [7] and the binary representation is done using the following equation: 
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ܾ݅ ൌ Ͳ݂݋ݎ ݔ݊ ൏ ͲǤͷܽ݊݀       ( 13 ) 
ܾ݅ ൌ ͳ݂݋ݎݔ݊ ൒ ͲǤͷ 
 
whereͲ ൏ ݅ ൏ ݊, n are the length of the chaotic sequence. 
 
The XOR operation between logistic map and session key stream mapping represents a strengthening of the key. 
This way, the confusion property means that the relationship between the plaintext and the cipher text is complex 
and involved as much as possible. 
 
B
Session Key
Rossler 
Attractor 
System
Binary 
Conversion
Session Key 
Stream 
Mapping
Session Key 
Stream
Pseudo Random Bit Generator 
[2] ْ
Session Key Algoritm
 
Fig. 3. Session Key Algorithm 
  
In figure 3, we can observe that the permutation functions are applied on all the components that play a 
role in the enrolment scheme. The permutation function will allow the original value to be re-arranged in 
such a way that will be very difficult to understand something from permuted value. 
Chaotic system is deterministic and sensitive to the initial values. According to this feature, it has complex active 
action, which can be used to protect data content. For example, the random sequence produced by chaotic 
phenomenon can be used to encrypt data in secret communication. This property makes the initial value suitable for 
the key that controls the data encryption or decryption. The one-way property makes neural network a suitable 
choice for hash function also. The model described in figure 4 stores the encrypted Biometric Template using 
Session Key. This approach is nothing but bio hashing or salting approach using key. A session key is an encryption 
and decryption key that is randomly generated to ensure the security of a communications session.  
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Fig. 4. Proposed Enrolment Scheme. 
 
Notations: 
BT – biometric template 
SK – represents the session key, which is created using two chaotic function, Rossler and Logistic map. 
The process of creating the session key is presented above. 
PSK – permuted session key, which is used to generate the expanded permuted transformation of the 
session keyሺܵܭሻ, ܨሺܵܭሻ is a function for permutation which is used above the Davies-May hash function. 
EBT – represents the biometric template which is encrypted. To generate biometric template encrypted, 
the Davies-May hash function ܨሺܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣ݈݃ሺܤܶǡܲܵܭሻሻ  is used. The hash function 
ܨሺܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣܮ݃ሺܤܶǡܲܵܮሻሻ is using simple XOR function and both functions ܨሺܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣܮ݃ሺܵܭǡ ݎሻሻ 
and ܨሺܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣ݈݃ሺܧܤܶǡܲܵܮሻሻ functions use beside of the hash function also permutations of bits by 
SK, EBT and ESK. 
PEBTPSK – The permuted encrypted BT and also the permuted session key (SK) will be used to generate 
the final concatenated biometric template ܨሺܦܯܪܽݏ݄ܣ݈݃ሺܧܤܶǡܲܵܮሻሻ. The same session key and the 
functions are used for decryption of the encrypted biometric template. 
 
The affiliation of this hash algorithm to the iterated hash function is obvious, so that if and attack occurs on the 
hash round function, it implies an attack of the same type, in other words with the same computation complexity, on 
the iterated hash function. In the algorithm we consider ܩ݊ߙ ሺݔͲሻas a “block cipher”, while the two sub-round 
functions ܪͳǡܪʹ resemble to the well-known Davies-Mays scheme. This can lead to believe that ܪͳǡܪʹ have almost 
similar complexities regarding the possible attacks as Davies-Mays scheme, which means that this hash function has 
at least the same computational security against the above mentioned attack. 
In order to point out the need of usage of analysis models for principal components and cluster analysis in the 
segmentation process of consumers, we have analysed the behaviour, need of loans, of the bank’s customers. 
Starting from a database of clients that have requested consumer loans through the two methods of analyse we have 
followed the main characteristics of the loan consumer; the whole process is directed on simplifying variables that 
describe the loan client’s profile and identification of segments, considering that a narrower client identification can 
have its benefits as well as regarding business opportunity, that would lead in selling a credit card, and as for 
reducing costs. 
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